Child has right to life, corporal punishment not justified: High Court refuses to overturn suicide abetment case

The court found no grounds to quash the indictment at this preliminary stage.

The court found no grounds to quash the indictment at this preliminary stage.

The Court observed: “A child being a precious national resource, he must be nurtured and cared for with tenderness and care… Subjecting the child to corporal punishment for the purpose of reforming him cannot be part of education as it causes incurable damage to the body and mind.”

Corporal punishment is incompatible with the child’s right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, causing harm to the child’s physical and mental health, the Chhattisgarh High Court (HC) recently ruled.

The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, who dismissed a petition filed by a nun, who worked as a teacher in a convent school, seeking to quash the charge sheet against her for allegedly abetting the suicide of a student. The court noted that “imposition of corporal punishment on a child is not in accordance with his right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”

The case involved Sister Mercy alias Elizabeth Jose (petitioner), a Christian nun and a teacher at Carmel Convent School in Ambikapur, Surguja district, who was charged under Section 305 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for abetting the suicide of Archisha Sinha, a Class 6 student of the school.

The petitioner, represented by advocates Devershi Thakur and Rajat Agrawal, submitted that she had no direct contact with the deceased as her teaching duties were limited to another class. She submitted that the FIR was based solely on a suicide note and the mere mention of her name in the suicide note of the deceased did not constitute sufficient ground for the charge. She also submitted that she had only reprimanded the student and taken her identity card as part of routine disciplinary proceedings and that she had no intention of abetting the student’s suicide and was only discharging her duties. The petitioner further submitted that her strict disciplinary approach had made her a target for false accusations by the respondent/complainant and that her actions did not meet the criteria of the charges levelled against her.

The suicide note stated that Sister Mercy had taken the ID cards of the deceased and two other students. According to the note, the students who accompanied her had described the teacher as “dangerous.” The note stated that the deceased student had been frightened by the teacher’s descriptions and had then acted out of fear, leading him to commit suicide on February 6, 2014.

Opposing the petition, panel counsel Kanwaljeet Singh Saini argued that the matter should be brought to trial on August 30, 2024, and that the evidence warranted further proceedings. He argued that the charge sheet and the FIR were valid, pointing to evidence suggesting that the petitioner’s actions may have contributed to the student’s distress.

The court stressed that at this stage it must focus only on the existence of a prima facie case, without delving into the defence arguments or detailed evidence.

The Court observed: “A child being a valuable national resource, he must be brought up and cared for with tenderness and care, and not with cruelty. Subjecting a child to corporal punishment for the purpose of reforming him cannot be part of education, as it causes incurable damage to the body and mind.”

The Supreme Court further elaborated on the meaning of the “right to life,” emphasizing that the right encompasses more than just animal survival, extending to a dignified existence free from cruelty and abuse. This broad interpretation of Article 21, according to the Court, includes several fundamental rights, such as the right to live with dignity, freedom from arbitrary and oppressive control, torture and terror, and protection from cruelty, physical or mental violence, injury, abuse and exploitation, including sexual abuse. “All these rights are available to the child and he cannot be deprived of them merely because he is small. Being small does not make him a lesser human being than an adult. It also seems to us that corporal punishment is not in keeping with the dignity of the child,” the Court observed.

The Court also referred to established precedents and international conventions and stated that “the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which imposes in clear terms on the State party the obligation to take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, ill-treatment, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of his or her parents, legal guardian or any other dependent person.”

The court pointed out that corporal punishment, if proven, would be incompatible with a child’s right to a dignified life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, concluding that the allegations in the FIR merited further investigation. The court said, “At this stage, the allegations made in the petition that the allegations made against the petitioner are false cannot be examined in exercise of powers under Section 528 of the BNSS (Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita),” formerly Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Accordingly, the court found no grounds to quash the indictment at this preliminary stage. It was held that “the present application is without merit and is therefore liable to be dismissed.”